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Maritime Security and the Blue Economy: intersections and interdependencies in the
Indian Ocean
Maritime security is essential to supporting the Blue Economy in a range of significant ways.
Many maritime security forums have been key supporters of the Blue Economy concept,
particularly in the Indian Ocean region where security partnerships among a range of
maritime nations have taken an active interest in articulating their role in addressing threats to
ocean-based economic development. This paper will explore the co-evolution and codependence of Blue Economy and maritime security agendas, with a particular focus on the
Indian Ocean region. It identifies two primary interactions between Blue Economy and
maritime security interests. Firstly maritime security is an enabler of the Blue Economy, for
example through safeguarding navigation routes, providing important oceanographic data to
marine industries and protecting rights over valuable marine resources and activities within
claimed zones of maritime jurisdiction. A second, but often overlooked, role that maritime
security operations and agencies play in the Blue Economy is by being itself a source of
economic development and growth. An expanded Blue Economy will create greater demand
for maritime security capabilities, and this in turn will trigger increased investment and
growth in these capabilities. The enhanced and increasingly diverse role that maritime
security will continue to play in the Blue Economy can be seen across all sectors in the Indian
Ocean Region.
Key words: Blue Economy, Blue Growth, maritime security, Indian Ocean
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1. Introduction
The term ‘Blue Economy’ has increasingly become an integral component of ocean
governance vernacular over the past decade, since it’s emergence at the 2012 United Nations
Convention on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), or Rio +20 Conference. The concept
was promoted at the Rio+20 Conference as the marine dimension of the broader ‘green
economy’, which was defined as an economy “that results in improved human well-being and
social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities”
(UNEP, 2011 p16). The Blue Economy emerged to reflect the fact that over 70% of the
earth’s surface is water. The oceans are crucial to global sustainability and play a key
equilibrating role in global climate as the primary sink for excess heat and carbon present in
the global climate system (UNEP et al., 2012). Indeed, the oceans are recognised as a vital
repository and supporter of global biological diversity, and are a critical source of food
through fisheries and aquaculture and are fundamental to the global economy through seaborne trade (Warner and Schofield, 2012 p.1).
The concept of a Blue Economy has been particularly championed by Small Island and
Developing States (SIDS) in recognition of their large ocean jurisdictions and the importance
of ocean and marine industries to their national economies (Silver, Gray, Campbell,
Fairbanks, & Gruby, 2015; Whisnant and Reyes, 2015). Since that time there has been
increasing interest in the concept of the Blue Economy around the world, yet the term is still
employed differently in different contexts and there is no one universally accepted definition
of what the Blue Economy is (Keen, Schwarz, & Wini-Simeon, 2017; Silver, et al., 2015).
There is strong interest in sustaining and expanding the Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean,
driven in particular by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and individual countries
including Seychelles, Mauritius, India and Australia (Llewellyn, English, & Barnwell, 2016;
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Mohanty, Dash, Gupta, & Gaur, 2015; National Marine Science Committee, 2015; National
Maritime Foundation, 2017; Purvis, 2015 p.226; Spamer, 2015). IORA makes a clear
distinction between the concept of the Blue Economy and more traditional ocean and coastal
economy models. They define the ocean economy as a segment of an economy, which is
dependent on ocean for the inputs required for production. The ocean economy does not
necessarily need to be located on the coast or on or in the oceans. The coastal economy, by
way of contrast, includes all economic activities taking place on or near the coast and is thus
defined in geographical terms. Finally IORA define the blue economy as a sub-set of the
ocean economy, which ‘covers all ocean related activities including direct and indirect
supporting activities required for functioning of these economic sectors, while adjusting to
the costs of environmental damage and ecological imbalance caused due to exploitation of
ocean resources for consumption. Therefore, the scope of blue economy is much wider and
inclusive’ (Mohanty, et al., 2015 p9).
Other definitions of the Blue Economy or Blue Growth have been established by the World
Oceans Council, the Australian Government, the United Nations, the World Wildlife Fund,
the Partnership for the Environmental Management of the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), the
European Union and The Economist magazine, amongst others (East Asian Seas Congress,
2012; Mohanty, et al., 2015; National Marine Science Committee, 2015; The Economist,
2015; United Nations, 2014; Whisnant and Reyes, 2015; WWF Baltic Ecoregion Programme,
2015). There are many commonalities across these definitions, with most incorporating
economic, social and environmental objectives, and most highlighting a central role for
innovation and integrated management in fulfilling these objectives (Keen, et al., 2017).
Despite these commonalities, it is clear that the concept of the Blue Economy is fluid, and
opaque (Choi, 2017; Silver, et al., 2015; Winder and Le Heron, 2017).
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One of the enduring and critical questions often incorporated into discussions of the Blue
Economy relates to its sectoral scope. Given the Blue Economy is often thought of as a
subset of the ocean economy, identification and valuation of the segments or sectors that
make up the ocean economy is often the first step in the process of planning Blue Economy
development or identifying potential Blue Economy opportunities (Colgan, 2016). A diverse
array of ‘taxonomies’ of the ocean economy, such as the one outlined in Table 1, have been
developed to assist this analysis (Kildow and McIlgorm, 2010; Alistair McIlgorm, 2005; The
Economist, 2015).
[Insert Table 1]
Questions remain as to what differentiates the ocean and Blue Economies in relation to
sectoral scope, however it is clear that potential exists within all sectors to improve
environmental performance and grow social and economic benefits. In this regard at least, all
sectors have the ability to become more ‘Blue’ (Voyer, Quirk, McIlgorm, Azmi, & Kaye,
2017).
Maritime security, in common with the Blue Economy, is a term which is widely used yet
poorly defined. In an analysis of the term, Bueger (2015) identified four key ways in which
the term ‘maritime security’ is understood. These included:


Sea power: the traditional role of maritime security agencies, particularly naval
forces, in the protection of states, including patrolling and protecting sea lanes,
claimed maritime zones and delimited maritime boundaries and coastal state rights
within these maritime spaces.



Marine safety: addressing threats to ships and maritime installations and assets,
including responding to maritime disasters and accidents at sea and participating in
search and rescue activities.
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Economic development: enforcing laws and regulations in relation to resource use in
the oceans, including countering piracy and smuggling and providing a secure
maritime environment which enables and supports economic development.



Human security: in relation to ensuring food security and sustainable livelihoods, with
a particular focus on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and human
trafficking (Bueger, 2015).

This paper will discuss the role that maritime security will play in the transition to a Blue
Economy, with a particular focus on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It will begin by
exploring the co-evolution of these two ambiguous concepts; ‘maritime security’ and the
‘Blue Economy’. It will then review the ways in which maritime security is contributing to
Blue Economy activities in the Indian Ocean, using the four categories of the ocean economy
outlined in Table 1 to frame the discussion: i) Extraction of non-living resources, ii)
Harvesting of living resources, iii) Commerce and trade in and around the ocean and iv)
Ecosystem protection and management, with particular reference to the four categories of
maritime security highlighted by (Bueger, 2015). Finally, it will summarise and discuss the
intersections between maritime security and the Blue Economy.
2. The co-evolution of ‘maritime security’ and the ‘Blue Economy’
The modern day concepts of maritime security and the Blue Economy both have their roots in
two significant historical influences on oceans governance. The first was the substantial
expansion of maritime claims seawards that was codified through the negotiation and drafting
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (UNCLOS, 1982). The
second was the broader sustainable development agenda, derived from the 1987 Brundtland
report and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Eikeset et al., 2018).
2.1. UNCLOS
5

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea took place between 1973 and
1982, and saw over 140 nations come together to develop an international legal framework
governing maritime rights and activities. UNCLOS provides for a 12 nautical mile limit to
the territorial sea – something that had eluded earlier efforts at codification. Moreover, the
concept of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), out to 200 nautical miles, gained general
international acceptance. Indeed the EEZ concept originates from the Indian Ocean region as
the term was first proposed by an Indian Ocean State, Kenya, in a working paper submitted to
the African-Asian Legal Consultative Committee in 1972, just prior to the start of the
negotiations leading to UNCLOS.
The EEZ represents a compromise between the predominantly resource-oriented interests of
coastal states and the interests of states concerned to preserve freedom of navigation. While
freedom of navigation and overflight for vessels and aircraft belonging to other states are
maintained, together with the rights for such states to lay submarine pipelines and cables, the
EEZ delivers sovereign rights in respect of living and non-living resources to the coastal
state. The potential significance of this expansion of coastal state resource rights offshore to
coastal states was well recognized in the immediate aftermath of the negotiation of UNCLOS
with a 1984 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report suggesting that 90% of
marine fish and shellfish were caught within 200 nautical miles of the coast (Schurman, 1998
p.107). Similarly, it was estimated that 87% of the world’s known submarine oil deposits
would fall within EEZ limits (Churchill and Lowe, 1999 p.162).
UNCLOS therefore both precipitated, and responded to, an increased level of attention and
interest in the economic opportunities that might be provided by oceans and the resources that
can be found within them. It was also highly influential in the changing role of security
agencies and activities on our oceans. Maritime security has always played a central role in
6

protecting and developing economic assets and resource use in coastal areas and open oceans.
This role has changed and evolved significantly, however, in response to expanded maritime
jurisdictions, coupled with a shift in the nature and extent of maritime threats, such as the rise
of terrorism and modern piracy (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017).
Significantly for both economic and maritime security interests, UNCLOS has gained
widespread international recognition and, at the time of writing, there were 168 parties to it,
comprising 167 states plus the European Union. Of the Indian Ocean’s 36 coastal states, 32
are parties to the Convention. The exceptions are Eritrea, Iran, Israel and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) (United Nations, 2017). Additionally, the two extra-regional states with
Indian Ocean possessions, France and the United Kingdom, are parties to UNCLOS. The
Indian Ocean littoral States have proved to be similarly enthusiastic in terms of claims to
maritime jurisdictions meaning that broad swaths of the Indian Ocean are subject to EEZ
claims and assertions of continental shelf rights. The latter have included full submissions or
submissions of preliminary information to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) on the part of 18 Indian Ocean states concerning the
delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf seawards of 200 nautical mile EEZ
limits (UN CLCS, 2017).
UNCLOS has therefore both clarified and significantly expanded offshore rights. This has
provided nations with rights over considerable marine resources and activities. Thus, with
this increase in the scope of maritime jurisdiction came the right to access and exploit marine
resources as well as to manage offshore industrial activities. Such novel activities provide the
promise of new economic income streams through a range of developing marine industries
including aquaculture, ocean energy production, marine ecotourism, carbon capture and
storage and seabed mining.
7

2.2. Sustainable Development
Around the same time as UNCLOS was being negotiated, there was a concurrent and
growing awareness of the need to better consider the environmental impacts of natural
resource use and extraction. The 1987 Brundtland report recognized the importance of
development which accounted for the needs of future generations and the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit advanced the notion of sustainable development – development which considers
these needs through the consideration of social and environmental objectives, alongside
economic objectives (Brundtland, 1987). In particular, the Earth Summit advanced the notion
of a ‘Green Economy’, later defined as an economy “that results in improved human wellbeing and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological
scarcities” (UNEP, 2011 p16).
The initial focus of sustainable development and Green Economy efforts and activity largely
related to terrestrial systems. However, 25 years after the release of the Brundtland Report,
SIDS began to challenge this focus and emphasized the importance of the ocean and coastal
economy to their countries. The 2012 United Nations Convention on Sustainable
Development (UNCSD), or Rio+20 conference, placed a heavy focus on the Green Economy
and SIDS used this opportunity to highlight the importance of considering the marine
environment within this model of development. They were the first to put forward the
concept of a Blue Economy as the ocean based component of the Green Economy (Silver, et
al., 2015; Whisnant and Reyes, 2015), and were successful in introducing this concept into
increasingly common usage.
2.3. Implications and intersections
The historical development of UNCLOS and maritime security is interconnected in a number
of significant ways. The ratification of UNCLOS has resulted in an increased awareness of
8

the enormous opportunity offered through rights over vastly expanded zones of maritime
jurisdiction and the valuable marine resources and activities within them. The sustainable
development agenda, coupled with the advocacy work of SIDS in drawing attention to the
oceans, has emphasized the need for development to be environmentally sustainable and
socially equitable. Both these development have resulted in a greatly enhanced, and more
diversified role for maritime security commitments, as coastal states seek to protect and
safeguard their natural and economic assets.
The increased interest in the economic opportunities provided by the oceans has heightened
the need for maritime spaces to be clearly defined and safeguarded, including through
significantly increased maritime surveillance and enforcement requirements. Maritime
security has therefore evolved to expand beyond predominately naval defence of states and
sovereign interests through military action, to include a range of additional roles and
functions related to what is often termed ‘non-traditional’ threats (S. Bateman, 2016). In
particular, significantly expanded maritime zones and marine resource-related rights, as well
as increasingly diverse offshore activities, have created the need for substantially enhanced
maritime surveillance and enforcement requirements. Maritime security is now a term which
incorporates a diversity of actors - military and civilian, across both the public and private
sectors – addressing multiple threats. Furthermore, even within the traditional defence forces,
maritime security has evolved to extend beyond the military domain to incorporate additional
constabulary and diplomatic roles (S. Bateman and Bergin, 2009; Upadhyaya, 2014). In
addition, with many threats and benefits crossing multiple maritime jurisdictions, security
arrangements have necessarily become increasingly cooperative and have led to the
development of a range of regionalised alliances (S. Bateman, 2016; Bueger and Edmunds,
2017).
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Maritime security is increasingly playing a role in guarding against environmental damage
and policy environmental regulations, such as Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and fisheries
regulations, highlighting the complex intersections with all aspects of the Blue Economy. The
nature and extent of these intersections are examined in greater detail in the following
sections, with a particular focus on the IOR.
3. The role of maritime security in the Indian Ocean Blue Economy
The Indian Ocean is a vast maritime zone covering 68.56 million square kilometres and
incorporating coastal states from the southern tip of South Africa to the west coast of
Australia (Upadhyaya, 2014). Thirty-six countries have access to the Indian Ocean, with vast
differences in the cultural, social and economic conditions of many of these states. As the
world’s third largest ocean, and with approximately one-third of the world’s population living
in the Region, the Indian Ocean has significant potential to contribute to global efforts to
combat poverty, enhance food security and provide for new economic opportunities
(Upadhyaya, 2014). The Blue Economy is a concept which seeks to promote innovative and
environmentally responsible development of these opportunities. The following sections will
explore the role that maritime security plays, and has the potential to play, in these efforts in
the region, based around four overarching categories of the ocean economy.
3.1.

Extraction of non-living resources, or resource generation

This category of the ocean economy relates to largely static, and geographically discrete
operations such as oil and gas extraction, future deep seabed mining operations, water
desalination, and maritime renewable energy such as tidal, wind or wave energy generation.
The fixed nature of mineral resources, and the infrastructure associated with renewables,
means that questions of jurisdiction are extremely relevant to this aspect of the ocean
economy. As they generally occur within the EEZ or territorial waters of a state, their
10

management is primarily a coastal state concern. In part, this has been a significant driver in
efforts from countries around the world to delimit their maritime boundaries, in order to
clarify the extent of their maritime jurisdictions and thereby ensure that they have rights over
any resources (living and non-living) that occur within their waters. For resources in the high
seas, which are of particular interest for potential deep seabed mining and biotechnology,
there has also been significant progress in defining the rights and responsibilities states that
might wish to exploit these as part of broader negotiations around Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction (ABNJ) (see section 3.4.1).
The management, expansion and growth of the Blue Economy in relation to the extraction of
non-living resources, or resource generation are therefore heavily predicated on the clear
articulation and resolution of jurisdictional questions. As noted above, UNCLOS provides for
extended zones of maritime jurisdiction through continental shelf rights and the EEZ, and
Indian Ocean coastal states have been enthusiastic claimants to these zones. Due to the
proximity of other neighbours, many coastal states, Indian Ocean littoral states included, are
often unable to claim the full extent of their maritime zones as set out under UNCLOS. The
extension of coastal state claims has therefore led to significant areas of overlapping maritime
claims and thus a proliferation in potential maritime boundaries. Where overlapping claims to
territorial seas out to 12 nautical miles exist, Article 15 of UNCLOS applies whilst Articles
83 and 73 deal with delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ respectively.
Unfortunately, these articles provide only limited guidance regarding maritime delimitation,
meaning that there is ample scope for conflicting maritime claims and maritime boundary
disputes.
Here it can be observed that there is a marked contrast between the east and west of the
Indian Ocean with regard to maritime boundary delimitation. While in the east over 20
11

maritime boundary agreements have been concluded and the maritime boundary mosaic is
largely complete with the notable exception of the boundaries associated with Timor-Leste
(see below), in the west by contrast only seven maritime boundaries have been delimited
since 1976 (Prescott and Schofield, 2005 p.461-462).
In part this disparity can be attributed to differing coastal geography. Although each sector
contains a single large island – Sri Lanka in the east and Madagascar in the west, the eastern
and western halves of the Indian Ocean are geographically distinct. The eastern Indian Ocean
is characterised by major archipelagos, most notably that of Indonesia, but also the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands group. These island groups are predominantly located towards the Indian
Ocean’s mainland margins and there are relatively few isolated islands, although Australia’s
Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Christmas Island are notable exceptions to this general rule. In
contrast, the western part of the Indian Ocean features predominantly smooth continental
coastlines, coupled with numerous small isolated islands and groups of islands such as the
Comoro Islands group and islands scattered through the Mozambique Channel, the
Seychelles, the Maldives, the Chagos Archipelago, Reunion and Mauritius (Prescott and
Schofield, 2005 p. 461).
Geopolitical factors also play an important role. Significant civil unrest in, for example,
Somalia and Yemen, has tended to relegate maritime boundary delimitation to the back
burner in a number of cases in the western portion of the Indian Ocean (Prescott and
Schofield, 2005 p.462). Excessive claims to baselines along the coast from which maritime
zones are measured are also a source of dispute (Roach and Smith, 2012). Similarly, the
Indian Ocean features multiple sovereignty disputes over islands which, in turn, impede
maritime boundary delimitation with respect to the maritime spaces associated with them.
These island disputes include:
12



Scattered islands in the Mozambique Channel: France retains control over a number
of tiny island territories located in the Mozambique Channel, namely Bassas da India,
Europa Island, the Glorioso Islands and Juan de Nova Island, all of which are also
claimed by Madagascar.



Mayotte Island, whose population voted in favour of remaining under French
jurisdiction when the Comoro Islands achieved independence, is nonetheless claimed
by the Comoro Islands.



Tromelin Island, a small, uninhabited islet located approximately 280 nautical miles
east of Madagascar and around 340 nautical miles north of Mauritius and Reunion is
likewise under French administration but is claimed by Mauritius.



Diego Garcia and the Chagos Archipelago: Located in the central, northern Indian
Ocean these islands are retained by the United Kingdom as the remnant of the British
Indian Ocean Territory but are also claimed by Mauritius.

While considerable progress has been made towards the delimitation of maritime boundaries
in the Indian Ocean, many potential maritime boundaries remain undelimited. This is
problematic from both Blue Economy and maritime security perspectives. Where overlapping
maritime claims exist, the resultant uncertainty over jurisdiction tends to complicate ocean
resource access and management. The sustainable management of marine living resources
can be severely hampered where maritime boundaries remain unsettled and potentially broad
areas of disputed waters exist. At the least, uncoordinated policies damage management of
shared stocks while at the more severe end of the spectrum, potentially destructive and
unsustainable competition for access to the resources in question can result. With respect to
non-living resources, overlapping claims generally tend to prevent access to any mineral
resources such as hydrocarbons as international oil and gas companies tend to be extremely
13

risk averse in the absence of fiscal and legal certainty and continuity (Schofield, 2011). For
example, Australia and Timor-Leste’s longstanding dispute concerning maritime delimitation
and joint arrangements in the Timor Sea has prevented development of the Greater Sunrise
complex of predominantly gas fields worth an estimated $6 billion (Schofield, 2007). Happily
there are indications that this dispute is progressing towards resolution (PCA, 2017).
The IOR is therefore a clear demonstration of the reliance of successful Blue Economy
development of safe, secure and peaceful resolution of maritime boundaries, and the potential
for a role for traditional sea power functions in cases where this resolution is not forthcoming.
Maritime claims, limits and boundaries define areas over the ocean where coastal states have
rights and such rights need to be protected. This is particularly true for critical infrastructure
and high cost fixed assets associated with the extraction of non-living resources, such as oil
and gas platforms and renewable energy installations, which have potential to be at risk from
terrorist activities (Mehdiyev, 2012 ). This places a significant burden on coastal states with
broad maritime zones in terms of providing for adequate surveillance of their waters and
enforcement where necessary. This burden has been offset to some extent by increasingly
sophisticated technologies associated with monitoring and surveillance, or Maritime Domain
Awareness, which has attracted significant investment in new technologies in the region (see
section 3.3.3).
3.2. Harvesting of living resources
This category of the ocean economy relates to a variety of methods of living resource
extraction from the oceans, including fisheries, aquaculture and marine bio-technology. One
of the distinct challenges of this sector is managing transboundary, common property
resources especially fisheries, which require a co-ordinated and multi-lateral approach.
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Maritime security has played a particularly significant constabulary and diplomatic role in
addressing threats to the effective management of these resources.
Marine capture fisheries in the Indian Ocean represent around 16 per cent of global catches,
with substantial growth in the eastern half of the Indian Ocean over the last decade. Three of
the top 10 marine capture fisheries countries are in the Indian Ocean Rim (FAO, 2016 p.8).
Fisheries account for a large portion of economic activity in many large and small Indian
Ocean coastal states. In the Maldives, for example, fisheries account for 90% of exports and
in Seychelles, fisheries account for over half of foreign exchange earnings (Michel, 2014
p.111). Fisheries also play a vital role in livelihoods and food security. For example,
inhabitants of Bangladesh, Comoros, Indonesia, Maldives, and Sri Lanka get more than half
of the animal protein in their diets from fish (FAO, 2014). Ensuring the fisheries resources of
the region are sustainably managed is therefore critical to the long term social and economic
health of the region. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing is considered a major
threat to the ability to manage fisheries resources sustainably and to realize the potential of a
Blue Economy. Despite this, monitoring, control and surveillance systems in the region are
known to be weak, with fisheries governance fragmented across multiple organizations and
agreements and, as noted above, the incomplete delimitation of maritime boundaries in the
region (FAO, 2016 p.10-16; Michel, 2014 p.116).
The transboundary nature of IUU fishing means that maritime safety and security is
recognized as a priority area for regional cooperation. In 2015, IORA members signed the
IORA Maritime Cooperation Declaration, which committed members to “address maritime
challenges such as Illegal Unreported and Unregulated fishing” (para 5) including by
“[e]nhancing coordination and communication between and among national maritime
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agencies and authorities and other relevant fora…[and]…enhanc[ing] cooperation on
maritime safety, marine environmental protection and maritime security.” (IORA, 2015)
The development of a regional approach to managing IUU fishing remains in its early stages
in the IOR but will undoubtedly require significant attention as countries look to grow and
expand their Blue Economies. For example, since the settlement of maritime boundaries
within the Bay of Bengal in 2014 (PCA, 2014; Schofield, Telesetsky, & Lee, 2013), countries
such as Bangladesh have recognized the significant potential that exist within its largely
unexploited offshore fisheries (Hussain, Failler, Karim, & Alam, 2017). Successfully
exploiting this resource will require investment in appropriate vessels and fishing
technologies to fish in remote and deep water locations as well as a cooperative surveillance
and security activities between neighbouring countries to guard against IUU (Hussain, et al.,
2017).
It is also well recognised that addressing IUU fishing requires addressing the systemic drivers
of IUU fishing. In this regard maritime security actors play an active diplomatic role in
supporting improvements in governance arrangements and the implementation of aid
programs which seek to contribute to poverty alleviation and improvements in community
wellbeing (DFAT, 2015).
The exploitation of living resources therefore involves engagement with all aspects of
maritime security. Competition for living marine resources in disputed waters (as outlined in
Section 3.1) clearly has maritime security dimensions as, for example, confrontation between
rival fishing fleets has the potential to draw in the maritime enforcement forces of the coastal
states concerned with the potential for incidents to escalate towards conflict. This traditional
sea power function is complemented by a focus on economic development and human
security aspects of maritime security, which involves enforcing relevant laws and regulations
16

and addressing IUU from a both a diplomatic and constabulary perspective. Finally, marine
safety functions are also significant for this component of the Blue Economy particularly in
regard to search and rescue, which will be increasingly critical as maritime nations expand
their interests into more remote offshore fisheries, as seen by the Bangladesh example.
3.3. Commerce and trade in and around the ocean
This category of the ocean economy relates to shipping and transportation, ports, coastal
development and marine and coastal tourism and is the category in which maritime crime
poses the most significant threat to a stable, and sustainable, Blue Economy. Many of these
threats cross national jurisdictions and therefore require a coordinated maritime security
approach. Maritime transport is recognised as the backbone of the global economy
accounting for over 80% of world trade, amounting to in excess of 10 billion tonnes of goods
shipped in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2016). The Indian Ocean hosts some of the busiest shipping
lanes in the world, with 25-30% of global shipping movements occurring in the region
(Llewellyn, et al., 2016). Approximately 100,000 ships transit the region annually, carrying
up to a third of the world’s bulk cargo, half of the containers and two-thirds of the oil
(Upadhyaya, 2014). This creates great opportunities and carries with it many potential
threats. There is also significant capacity for growth in tourism in the region, especially from
the burgeoning cruise ship sector. Cruise tourism is currently estimated to be worth 35.5
billion U.S. dollars, yet the bulk of this occurs in the Mediterranean and Caribbean with only
a small fraction occurring in the IOR (Statista, 2016). This is largely due to the volatile nature
of security in the region. Growing this sector will require enhanced, and coordinated
maritime security capabilities alongside careful management and maintenance of ecosystem
health and the visual amenity of natural areas (Llewellyn, et al., 2016).
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3.3.1. Background
There has been significant activity with the IOR designed to enhance and grow the potential
contribution of commerce and trade to the region’s economy. While many countries in the
region have ambitions to expand their interests in shipping and ports, the most ambitious
plans for this development come from outside the region. The proposal by the Chinese
Government for a One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR) has the potential to play a
significant role in the future of the Blue Economy in this region. Announced in 2013 by
President Xi Jinping during visits to Central Asia and Southeast Asia, OBOR aims to expand
economic integration along corridors toward Central Asia, Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa
and the Middle East (Blanchard and Flint, 2017 p.226). While information around this
proposal is limited, its central platform is the development of six economic corridors based
around two main transport routes: an overland link from China through Central Asia to the
Europe (the ‘belt’); and a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” through Southeast Asia and the
Indian Ocean to the Middle East, Africa and Europe (the ‘road’) (ESCAP, 2017). The vision
for the OBOR is framed around five pillars that reflect many of the same key principles
espoused within the Blue Economy: green development, ocean-based prosperity, maritime
security, innovative growth and collaborative governance.
The Maritime Silk Road is aimed at promoting the expansion of coastal economies and
maritime ‘clusters’ akin to special economic zones (Walsh, 2017) and developing
infrastructure to support trade and trade routes across the Indian Ocean. In particular the
OBOR is relevant to Blue Economy developments in ports and shipping in the Indian Ocean,
given its central position in the Maritime Silk Road and its overland links to sections of the
inland ‘belt’ (D. Brewster, 2017; ESCAP, 2017). This has led to a growing interest, and
investment, from China in the development of ports in the Indian Ocean (see Khurana, 2016).
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The OBOR and the Maritime Silk Road are clear examples of the interaction, and sometimes
uneasy relationship, that exists between the Blue Economy and maritime security. While they
have clear economic drivers, the OBOR and the Maritime Silk Road may also have a
significant influence on the security environment and geopolitical balance in the Indian
Ocean. China sees OBOR as promoting economic cooperation between participating
countries and boosting global trade more generally. This contrasts with the views of the US
(and others such as India), who see it as a potential “geopolitical threat” (Blanchard and Flint,
2017; Khurana, 2016). For example, Khurana (2016) argues that China will likely use
economic (and humanitarian) drivers for a naval presence in the region (i.e. “military
operations other than war”) as a way of legitimizing a strategic foothold.
In February 2016 China commenced construction of its first foreign military base – a naval
base in Djibouti. This is a further reflection of both China’s ambitions to spread its reach
beyond its immediate neighbourhood and its strong interest in protecting its maritime trade
interests in the Indian Ocean (Krupakar, 2017). Increasing economic interests arguably create
the need to protect them, and it this is likely to lead to an increased role for maritime security
in the region (Blanchard and Flint, 2017; Figliomeni, 2012).
3.3.2. Threats
Some of the most significant threats to the growth of ocean-based economies in the IOR
relate to maritime crime including piracy, terrorism and smuggling. Somali piracy is perhaps
one of the most striking examples of the potential impacts of these crimes on the
development of a Blue Economy in the region. In the mid-2000s piracy off the coast of
Somalia began to pose a major threat to cargo vessels, fishing boats and private yachts,
building to a peak in 2011 when more than 300 attacks and nearly 30 hijackings were
reported (Larsen, 2015). The impacts of these attacks on global trade, food security and
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tourism were recognised by countries in the region but were a challenge to address. In part
this was due to the transboundary nature of piracy, which required a coordinated approach,
across a number of navies, coastguards, domestic judicial systems and the private sector
(Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Larsen, 2015). Piracy falls under ‘universal jurisdiction’ under
UNCLOS, meaning that any state can intercept piracy suspects on the high seas. This allowed
navies from around the world to apprehend suspected pirates. Amongst the private sector,
armed security guards have been employed to protect vessels travelling in the region, raising
coastal state security concerns (Schofield, 2014). This option has proved effective, however,
as under these arrangements no successful attack has been recorded since 2012. The threat of
piracy remains real throughout the region, however, particularly in areas marked by political
instability and poverty (Larsen, 2015; Upadhyaya, 2014). Many of the cooperative
approaches to managing Somali piracy have therefore remained in place, and in fact have
been increasingly formalised in recent years (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; McCabe, 2018).

The IOR has additionally been considered a focus for potential terrorism activities, due to
weak governance arrangements and known connections with Al-Qaeda in countries like
Somalia. This has made the region a focus on US led anti-terrorism activities, with a focus on
an increased naval presence in the region aimed at increasing surveillance and intelligence
gathering. This increased naval presence is likely to have served as an additional deterrent to
piracy activities in the region (McCabe, 2018 p169).

In addition to threats associated with criminal behaviours, natural and human induced
disasters are a significant risk to the Blue Economy in the IOR. The Indian Ocean has nine
recognised ‘choke points’ for shipping movements. These narrow channels carry increased
risks from piracy and terrorism but also create significant difficulties in managing traffic and
navigation (Llewellyn, et al., 2016; Upadhyaya, 2014). Maritime collisions and accidents can
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have profound environmental, social and economic impacts and therefore are a natural enemy
of an effective Blue Economy.
3.3.3.

Response to threats

It is clear that commerce and trade in and around the ocean have the potential to play a highly
significant role in the future IOR Blue Economy, but in order to achieve its full potential,
significant maritime security threats will need to be addressed. Not least of the security
challenges involve surveillance and monitoring to ensure effective deterrence and timely
response to potential threats and disasters. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) relates to the
comprehensive knowledge of the situation at, or related to the seas, and consists of the
combination of ‘situational awareness’ (or what can be observed at sea) and ‘threat
awareness’ (or what threats are anticipated or suspected)(Rahman, 2010). It has become an
increasingly prominent component of maritime security with the increased threat of terrorism
but is also relevant to the management of other forms of maritime crime. For example, in
response to the Somali piracy issue an information sharing platform named ‘Mercury’ was
developed, which allowed the sharing of data in real time across naval and civilian operations
(Bueger and Edmunds, 2017).
The tools of MDA including vessel tracking data (such as automatic identification systems),
sensors, satellite and radar data, customs and immigration information, intelligence, databases
and environmental information (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017; Rahman, 2010). These multiple
sources of data allow for a systematic and comprehensive understanding of a broad array of
maritime related activities, including infrastructure and shipping channels, such as cargo and
vessel movements (Rahman, 2010). Effective MDA also benefits Blue Economy sectors, as
the data is often shared with Governments and the private sector (and vice versa). For
example, Australia’s Integrated Marine Observing System (IMOS) gathers regular physical,
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biogeochemical and biological data relating to oceanic conditions which is then shared with a
range of private and public sector actors to assist in management, research, development and
commercial activities (Bergin, 2016).
MDA is recognised to be a necessarily cooperative activity, incorporating data from public
and private sectors, across both civilian and military actors and multiple jurisdictions.
Cooperation is also required to manage the response to actualised threats. The Indian
maritime security think tank, the National Maritime Foundation, identify the lack of a clear
transboundary maritime security framework as a key challenge to providing the necessary
protection for economic assets (National Maritime Foundation, 2017). To date the naval
forces of the IOR have played a significant role in addressing many of the threats relating to
piracy, terrorism and smuggling, with the Indian Navy playing a leading role in developing
regional maritime security approaches. Somali piracy also provided for an increased role for
countries outside the IOR, including EU and NATO member states (S. Bateman, 2016;
Larsen, 2015).
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) was developed to facilitate greater cooperation
and interoperability amongst the various navies and coastguards within the IOR and outside
the region, and has 35 member countries including all 20 members of IORA (S. Bateman,
2016; Upadhyaya, 2014). It is recognised, however, that the disparate and geographical
vastness of the region, and the diversity of its economic interests, poses a challenge to
regional maritime security architecture (S. Bateman, 2016; Upadhyaya, 2014). Instead there
has been a greater focus on sub-regional organisations such as the Southern African
Development Community, which includes a maritime committee, and the African Union,
who developed an African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) in 2012 (S. Bateman, 2016).
These sub-regional institutions have been actively engaged in negotiations around the Blue
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Economy. For example, the AIMS has a particular focus on safeguarding the maritime
domain for wealth creation and includes a proposal which explores a transboundary approach
to economic development through a ‘Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa’ (S.
Bateman, 2016).
Commerce and trade in and around the ocean is a particularly significant, and increasingly
prominent, sector of the Blue Economy. Its relationship with maritime security in unarguable
– sea power and economic development functions relate to protection of shipping channels
and safe passage of vessels at sea. Maritime safety and human security functions are required
to prevent and respond to natural and human induced disasters at sea.
3.4. Ecosystem protection and management
While perhaps not traditionally considered a significant function of maritime security, there is
increasing recognition of the role that maritime security will need to play in safeguarding the
environmental health of the natural assets which form the basis on the Blue Economy. One of
the most significant contributions of maritime security actors to the environmental protection
objectives of a Blue Economy is through their constabulary role in enforcing environmental
regulations, including laws which prevent dumping of hazardous materials at sea. In
particular navies and coastguards are often involved in ensuring compliance with the
regulations of MPAs, which are growing in size and number throughout the IOR. Whilst,
from a legal perspective, this environmental protection role is a relatively straightforward
undertaking within areas of national jurisdiction, there remain significant ambiguities around
how the environment in ABNJ can be effectively safeguarded as Blue Economy interests
expand into these areas.
Over the past two decades, the international community has recognised the urgent need to
conserve and sustainably use the enormous wealth of marine biodiversity in the vast ocean
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ABNJ which make up almost half of the planet. The fragmentary international law
framework and governance structure applicable to ABNJ and the rapid depletion of fish
stocks on the high seas has provided the impetus for a process in the United Nations to
develop an international legally binding instrument on conservation and sustainable use of
marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (ILBI). UN General Assembly Resolution
69/292 provides that negotiations to develop the new ILBI (proposed for 2018) should
address the four elements of a package deal agreed by States in 2011 (United Nations General
Assembly, 2015). These elements comprise marine genetic resources including questions on
the sharing of benefits, measures such as area based management tools, including MPAs,
environmental impact assessments and capacity building and the transfer of marine
technology (United Nations General Assembly, 2016 para. 3). The process initiated by the
UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 69/292 to develop the elements of the ILBI has
the potential to contribute to a more integrated and cross sectoral system of oceans
governance at a global and regional scale (United Nations General Assembly, 2016). Once in
force, it also has the potential to enhance environmental and resource security across
substantial areas of ABNJ including the Indian Ocean and will include much clearer
articulation of the role that maritime security actors will play in ABNJ.
The contribution of maritime security to the ecosystem protection and management aspects of
the Blue Economy extend beyond enforcement of environmental regulations. They are also
engaged in research and monitoring activities which increase scientific understanding and
knowledge in relation to the marine environment, and are frequently involved in efforts to
predict, prevent and respond to environmental disasters. Defence agencies regularly collect
and monitor oceanographic, geographic, hydrographic and meteorological data as part of
their efforts to build both situational and potential threat awareness through MDA (Rahman,
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2010). This data also allows them to respond quickly, safely and effectively to natural and
human induced maritime disasters.
In the event of an accident or collision coastguards and navies are often first responders in
terms of both human safety – through search and rescue activities – as well as environmental
containment and impact management responses. This is also relevant to natural disasters,
with defence services playing a major role in the humanitarian response to disasters such as
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.
Finally, there is increasing recognition that maritime security agencies must themselves be
actively involved in managing the environmental impact of their activities. The Australian
Navy, for example, has developed policies to manage environmental risks and limit impacts
from their activities, including from waste, introduced marine pests and sonar activities,
which have the potential to impact marine mammals (Department of Defence, 2016b).
Moreover, technological innovations pioneered by Australian Navy, such as the renewable
energy-based micro-grid being developed to power its base on Garden Island, Western
Australia, HMAS Stirling, have been highlighted as potential options for small island
developing states in the Indian ocean such as Mauritius (Opray, 2017)
4. Discussion
Maritime security forums in the Indian Ocean region have been key supporters of the Blue
Economy concept. This support has taken a number of forms, including the development of
security partnerships across a range of maritime nations focused on addressing threats to
economic development from piracy and IUU fishing (David Brewster, 2014; Bueger, 2015;
National Maritime Foundation, 2017). Table 2 summarises some if the key findings of this
analysis in relation to the ways in which the Blue Economy and maritime security intersect. It
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points to two clear functions that maritime security plays in the development and growth of a
Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean region.


Maritime security as an enabler of the Blue Economy, and



Maritime security as a sector within the Blue Economy.

[INSERT TABLE 2]
4.1. Maritime Security as an enabler of the Blue Economy
Maritime security is considered essential to supporting the Blue Economy in a range of
significant ways, relevant to multiple sectors within the Blue Economy. As outlined in Table
2, all four elements of Maritime Security, as identified by Bueger (2015), were identified as
occurring with the Blue Economy and Maritime security nexus.
The traditional ‘sea power’ role of naval forces has been both enhanced and diversified
through the increased emphasis on delimitation of maritime jurisdiction, and increased
activity within and across claimed maritime zones. This is perhaps most dramatically
demonstrated through the increased military presence of Chinese naval forces in the IOR as it
expands its economic interests in the region through the Maritime Silk Road project.
Maintaining peace and security through peace keeping operations, international diplomacy
and aid programs play important roles in supporting the stability necessary for fostering and
growing economic relationships, and protecting crucial trade routes, and navies will continue
to be important in their traditional military role within the region.
Navies, particularly the Indian and Australian navies, have also diversified their activities into
non-traditional roles. Maritime security operations are often central to disaster response,
search and rescue operations and maritime incidents, such as oil spills or accidents at sea. In
this regard they play an important role in protecting human life and property, as well as
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environmental health (DFAT, 2015; National Marine Science Committee, 2015). The
importance of marine safety activities is especially pronounced in the IOR, given the region’s
particular vulnerabilities to human and natural disasters. These vulnerabilities include a
number of shipping ‘choke’ points, and coastal communities at risk from the increased
likelihood of natural disasters associated with climate change, including low lying SIDS.
MDA plays a key role in detecting maritime threats and developing strategies to avoid,
mitigate or respond effectively to these threats and, in turn, protect the economic and natural
assets which underpin the Blue Economy. The data gathered by maritime security agencies
through these activities also provides critical information needs relevant to the Blue
Economy, including weather and oceanic conditions, bathometric and oceanographic data and
vessel tracking. This data, much of which is shared with industry and across jurisdictions,
provides reliable and accurate information to assist maritime industries to plan and manage
their business activities and provides insights into potential new opportunities for ocean based
economic development.
At its core maritime security is designed to provide a stable and secure environment in which
economic development can occur and grow. Maritime security agencies contribute to the
Blue Economy through their defence of important maritime assets and infrastructure against
threats such as maritime terrorism. The link between economic development and maritime
security is therefore fundamental to the Blue Economy. This has been demonstrated in the
IOR through the role of maritime security in managing piracy, which has been seen to pose a
significant threat to economic activities in the region in recent history. This role will evolve
in the high seas as it responds to the future outcomes of the ABNJ process, as well as the
resolution of maritime boundary disputes. It will also necessitate an increasingly cooperative
approach as countries in the region seek to ensure the enforcement of laws and regulations
relating to resource use across jurisdictions, particularly in relation to fisheries management.
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Many of the maritime security measures designed to address economic development also
have implications for human security, given they are considered important tools in ensuring
ongoing food security and the development of new economic activities for some of the most
impoverished countries in the world.
4.2. Maritime Security as a sector within the Blue Economy
The other important, but often overlooked, role that maritime security operations and
agencies play in supporting the Blue Economy is by being itself a source of economic
development and growth. As the Blue Economy expands and grows in response to concerted
efforts within the region, there will be greater demand for maritime security capability. For
example, the activities associated with the Maritime Silk Road have been foreshadowed to
trigger significant investment in port development and shipping in the region, and will require
commensurate investment in security and defence. There will therefore be an increasing role
for navies, coastguards and private maritime security agencies in an expanded Blue
Economy, which will include policing maritime crime, conducting monitoring and
surveillance and participating in search and rescue. This is likely to drive additional
investment in shipbuilding and associated infrastructure within the region. For example, the
Australian Defence white paper points to significant investments in amphibious vessels,
offshore patrol vessels, frigates and submarines and includes a particular emphasis on
innovation in these activities (Department of Defence, 2016a).
Another likely outcome of an increased emphasis on maritime security within a growing Blue
Economy will be the enhanced need for training and capacity development activities. This
will be required to assist local countries to develop effective coastguard and defence
capabilities, as well as the necessary skills and expertise to contribute to MDA activities
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(Bueger and Edmunds, 2017). Education and training in maritime security is hence likely to
be another ‘Blue growth’ industry in the IOR and beyond.
The role of maritime security as a sector within the Blue Economy is difficult to quantify,
given the wide array of industries it incorporates and problems with effectively defining the
extent of maritime security operations across both the public and private sectors. For this
reason it is often absent from attempts to value the current worth of ocean or Blue economies
(e.g. see Australian Institute of Marine Science, 2016; Alistair McIlgorm, 2005; Alistair
McIlgorm, 2016). The full extent of the contribution of maritime security to global
economies therefore remains poorly understood but is likely to be significant, and growing.
4.3. Conclusion
Analysis of the intersection of the Blue Economy and maritime security in the IOR points to
the mutually co-dependent nature of both. The UNCLOS has resulted in greater attention on
the economic potential of the oceans as coastal states seek to make maximum use of their
expanded maritime claims. This has precipitated an increased and more diversified role of
maritime security in the world’s oceans. The Blue Economy as a concept has evolved out of
this increased interest in the economic potential of the resources contained within national
jurisdictions. It recognises the importance of sustainable use and environmental protection as
necessary to secure the ongoing availability of the opportunities provided by the oceans. It is
also heavily reliant on maritime security to protect these opportunities from a range of
threats, and to provide a safe and secure environment which enables the development of these
opportunities. With the increased role of maritime security, will come increased investment
and growth of support industries, such as shipbuilding, suppliers of technology to assist with
MDA and maritime infrastructure, such as ports. This, in itself, with generate new economic
and employment opportunities for the IOR.
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Table 1 – Sectors that contribute to the ocean economy (adapted from The Economist, 2015)

Extraction of nonliving resources, or
resource generation
Seabed/ Deep seabed
mining
Oil and gas
Water (desalination)
Dredging
Energy/renewables
(tidal/wave energy;
coastal/offshore
wind)

Harvesting of living
resources

Commerce and
trade in and around
the ocean
Fisheries
Shipping (marine
transportation)
Aquaculture
Shipbuilding and
repair
Marine bioMarine construction
technology
(e.g. jetties etc)
Recreational fishing and boating
Marine transport
Port infrastructure
equipment
and services
manufacturing
Seafood processing

Ecosystem protection
and management
Blue Carbon
Surveillance and
maritime security
Habitat protection/
restoration
Hazard protection
Ecological/ ecosystem
research

Marine services (e.g. Waste treatment and
mapping,
disposal
monitoring,
consulting, maritime
insurance, etc.)
Marine education and R&D
Coastal Development
Marine and coastal
tourism
Defence

Maritime security and the Blue Economy
Table 2 – Matrix outlining the intersections between maritime security and the Blue Economy

Enabling the
Blue
Economy

Contributing
to the Blue
Economy

Extraction of nonliving resources,
or resource
generation
Seapower:
Peacekeeping,
defence and
surveillance
activities within
expanded maritime
zones, including
disputed territories.

Harvesting of
living resources

Commerce and
trade in and
around the ocean

Ecosystem
protection and
management

Economic
development and
human security:
managing
IUU fishing
through
cooperative
regional
arrangements

Seapower:
Managing
geopolitical threats

Human security:
Surveillance and
data provision for
disaster
management and
response

Economic
development:
Maritime crime
prevention and
management
through patrol
activities,
monitoring and
surveillance
(piracy, terrorism,
smuggling, human
trafficking).

Marine safety and
economic
Marine safety and
development:
economic
Seapower:
Enforcement of
development:
Manging conflict
resource use and
especially in
in disputed
environmental
relation to energy
territories.
protection
security through
regulations (e.g
the protection of
Human security:
MPAs). Protecting
maritime assets and search and rescue
against
infrastructure, such e.g fishing vessels Marine safety and
environmental
as oil rigs and
human security:
crimes (e.g. IUU
renewables
MDA and disaster fishing, illegal
management
dumping at sea)
Expanded naval
Public and private sector engagement in enforcement
fleets with
activities, including patrol boat building.
associated
shipbuilding and
Expanded MDA, innovation in surveillance and monitoring
associated
technologies.
industries

